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RÉSUMÉ 
 
La présente contribution examine les fondements normatifs ainsi que les implications 
éthiques du droit à l’eau, tel qu’il fut reconnu en 2002 par le comité onusien des droits 
économiques, sociaux et culturels. Il sera défendu que le droit à l’eau potable peut être 
justifié en tant que droit moral fondamental, de par son caractère indispensable en vue de la 
garantie des conditions basiques de survie. Cet état de fait, cependant, s’avère moins évident 
au vue d’un droit à l’eau d’usage non-domestique. Ici, la discussion se rapproche des débats 
accompagnant le concept beaucoup plus complexe des droits sociaux et économiques. Par 
rapport à ce groupe de droits, la question de l’allocation est des plus controversées: à qui 
incombe-t-il de garantir leur respect? Dans le but d’éviter cette problématique d’allocation, 
le présent essai soulèvera la question de savoir, si la limitation de l’accès à l’eau peut être 
conçue comme une violation d’autres droits moraux: bien qu’il y ait des cas où des 
entreprises transnationales déploient des activités nuisibles à l’égard des populations pauvres 
en polluant sciemment leurs ressources en eau ou en initiant et en exécutant des stratégies de 
privatisation les privant de leurs droits, la crise globale de l’eau ne saura être rattachée 
uniquement aux effets de la mondialisation. Plutôt, l’on reconnaîtra la nécessité d’efforts 
positifs et soutenus de la part des pays développés en vue de la réalisation d’un 
approvisionnement suffisant en eau pour tous.  
 
 
 
                                            
1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Seventh International Conference on Ethics 
and International Development organised by IDEA at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, July 
2006. I am grateful to the audience on that occasion for their comments and to Jean-Daniel Strub, 
Thora Martina Herrmann and above all Des Gasper for detailed suggestions that have helped me in 
revising the paper for publication. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper looks into the normative foundations and the ethical implications of a human 
right to water, endorsed as recently as 2002 by the UN Committee on Human Rights. The 
paper argues that a human right to drinking water is justifiable as fundamental moral right 
guaranteeing basic conditions for mere survival. This is less clear in the case of a right to 
productive water, which verges on a much broader concept of social and economic rights. 
There are ongoing controversies about the allocation problem of these rights: Who has to 
deliver on them? To avoid the allocation problem, the paper will examine whether lack of 
access to water can be deemed a violation of other moral rights. But although there are cases 
where transnational corporations harm the poor by polluting their water resources or by 
sustaining or initiating harmful forms of privatisation, the water crisis cannot be solely traced 
back to a problem of harmful forms of globalisation alone. There is, thus, need for positive 
efforts from the developed countries to make safe water for all a reality.  
 
 
 
Key words: human rights, privatisation of water, property rights, right to water, welfare 
rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While fresh, clean water is taken for granted in many places, it is a scarce resource in others. 
Some 1.1 billion people or 18 per cent of the world’s population still lack access to clean 
water supplies and some 2.6 billion people lack access to improved sanitation.2 More than 
2.2 million people in developing countries, most of them children, die each year from 
diseases related to lack of access to safe drinking water, inadequate sanitation, and poor 
hygiene. Over half of the developing world’s hospital beds are occupied by people suffering 
from preventable diseases caused by unsafe water and poor sanitation. Economies suffer as 
hygiene-related illness costs developing countries 5 billion working days a year,3 and the 
situation becomes increasingly complex and dire with the HIV/AIDS pandemic since a 
person with full-blown AIDS requires far more water than a healthy person.  
 
In view of these appalling facts, it is not surprising that the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has dedicated its 2006 report to the global water crisis.4 In its foreword, 
the Human Development Report rejects the view that the global water crisis is about absolute 
shortages of physical supply. Rather, “the roots of the crisis in water can be traced to 
poverty, inequality and unequal power relationships, as well as flawed water management 
policies that exacerbate scarcity.”5  To put it otherwise: access to safe water for all is feasible, 
and it has clear human rights dimensions.6 It is still above all the poor and marginalised 
groups that are worst affected since they frequently live in areas deprived of satisfactory 
access to water resources like rural or urban slum areas. As a consequence, they have to pay 
exorbitant prices for drinking water and – since they often cannot afford it – use polluted 
water rendering them sick.7 Women and girls who are in most cultures responsible for water 
supply at the household level and who have to carry water over long distances, tend to be 
especially afflicted with the lack of safe freshwater and sanitation facilities.8 The cost of this 
lack is reflected in the day-to-day investment of time to collect water, time that is not then 
available for productive activity, such as keeping the household, child care or education. But 
lack of access to safe water has also major effects on people’s health, and poor health 
                                            
2 See the Human Development Reports 2005 and 2006 by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 2000, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/). See also WHO/UNICEF 2000. 
3 See Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WASH), Progress Report 2000 – 
2003, http://www.wsscc.org/pdf/publication/WSSCC_Report_2002-2003_en.pdf. 
4 The complete report is available on http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/. 
5 UNDP 2000, V. 
6 Access to safe water cannot be secured without access to safe sanitation. I will focus in this paper on 
water, but we have to bear in mind that a successful realisation of the right to water depends among 
other things on the provision of safe sanitation. 
7 People living in the slums of Jakarta, Manila or Nairobi, pay 5-10 times more for water than those in 
high-income areas of their own cities – and they pay more than consumers in New York or London. 
See UNDP 2000, 7. 
8 See e.g. Aureli/Brelet 2004 and Brewster et al. 2006. 
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constrains in turn development and poverty alleviation.9 Water is also essential for farming 
and for manufacturing services. Making more water available to communities can improve, 
thus, families’ incomes by boosting crop production and the health of livestock.  
 
But in spite of its paramount importance to human well-being, water is not mentioned in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as adopted in 1948 and only rarely in other 
official human rights documents. Since lack of access to freshwater is one of the most 
serious threats to mankind in the 21st century, the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 2002 the General Comment No. 15, which recognises 
water not only as a limited natural resource and a public good but also as a human right. The 
alleged right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible 
and affordable water, and it must be enjoyed without discrimination and equally by women 
and men.10 But ever since, there are ongoing debates about how to conceive best of such a 
right, to what exactly it entitles one; and about what are the involved obligations for the 
states, the international community and the non-governmental organisations. Besides the 
legal, technical, social, cultural and above all political questions about how to best design 
and implement such a right to improved access to safe water for the global poor, there are 
also ethical questions referring to the alleged right, and it is these questions I will address in 
this paper. 
 
First, there are questions pertaining to the moral justification of the right. Whereas it may be 
true for legal human rights that they are – at least to a certain extent – whatever governments 
declare them to be, this is false in the case of moral human rights, whose validity is 
independent of any governmental body. This means that those rights are not alienable by 
governmental disrespect but persist, once acknowledged, irrespective of poor human rights 
policy. It is the very recognition of moral human rights (and the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights was groundbreaking precisely because it is thought of as being based upon 
moral rights) which makes room for an independent evaluation of the legal order. It has to be 
asked, thus, whether a right to water may be justifiable as a moral right. Second, there is 
need for clarification concerning the right’s content: To what exactly does the human right to 
water entitle one? To potable water only? Or also to irrigation water? Water in what quantity 
and quality? Third, questions arise pertaining to allocation issues: Who is responsible for the 
right’s fulfilment? Access to water seems to come, if at all, under the set of socio-economic 
rights. The dominant political conception of human rights understands the duties correlative 
to these rights as falling largely on states. But if governments don’t – and sometimes can’t – 
meet their citizens’ rights, the respective obligations pass over to the international 
community. Who exactly bears, then, the counterpart obligations of the alleged right to 
water?  
 
The aim of this paper is to deal with these questions. First, I will trace the right’s evolution 
and the international legislation (Section 1). For evaluation of the right, it is essential to 
                                            
9 See UNDP 2000, V, 6 and 41. Sub-Saharan Africa loses about 5% of GDP, or some $ 28.4 billion 
annually due to the water and sanitation deficit. This figure exceeds total aid flows and debt relief to 
the region in 2003 (UNDP 2000, 6). 
10 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2002. 
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understand the political and historical background against which the declaration of a right to 
water took place. Second, I will aim at clarifying the ethical questions underlying the debate 
(Section 2). I will then examine the argument that the industrialised world not only fails to 
act upon a right to water, but hinders the most disadvantaged from access to it; and will ask 
what could be extracted from the concepts of property and ownership (Section 3). Section 4 
provides a conclusion. 
 
The venue of the Seventh International Conference on Ethics and International Development 
is of particular interest to the topic of the human right to water. Uganda is – together with 
South Africa, Gambia, Ethiopia, and Zambia – among the few countries that have 
acknowledged the right to water in their national constitution. It started a comprehensive 
water sector reform ten years ago (as one of the first countries in Africa to do so). A lot of 
the water supplies have become commercialised, and many of the small towns have now a 
fairly well functioning water supply company; however, in many of these towns there are 
low-income areas (slums) which are poorly served. Uganda has, moreover, a strong 
‘affirmative action’ policy in its legislation, which provides an instructive background for 
addressing the right’s implementation process from a gender perspective. The gender 
perspective is most important to water rights, but left aside in this paper.11 
 
1 EVOLUTION AND CONTENT OF THE LEGAL HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
 
When the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR, 1966), adopted in 2002 the General Comment No. 1512 recognising water 
not only as a limited natural resource and a public good but also as a human right, this move 
was acknowledged worldwide as some sort of ‘revolution’. Non-governmental organisations 
and indigenous movements hoped that the debate on the right to water would command the 
attention of governments, international organisations and policy makers and that access to 
safe water and sanitation would be ranked higher on the political agenda. Even though a 
right to water seemed to be included in several other human rights, water was rarely 
mentioned separately and explicitly in human rights documents before. Explicit reference to 
the right to water has been made only in two of the six core international human rights 
treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979) and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); and also in one of the regional human 
rights instruments: the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)13. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 194814 proclaims that “[e]veryone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services 
                                            
11 For this aspect see e.g. Aureli/Brelet 2004 and Brewster et al. 2006. 
12 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cescr.htm, 8.2.2005. 
13 Valuable information on the different African Charters of Human Rights can be found in 
Evans/Murray 2002. 
14 UNO 1948. 
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[…]” (Art. 25.1), but the importance of water to achieve this aim is not made explicit. Article 
11 of the mentioned ICESCR recognises “[…] the right of everyone to an adequate standard 
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing […]” and 
article 12 states “[…] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health […]”15, and the World Health Organization’s 
constitution enshrined the right to the “highest attainable standard of health” over fifty years 
ago – but again, there is no mention of water. It was only in 2000 that the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ICESCR’s supervisory body, 
adopted a General Comment on the right to health that provides a normative interpretation of 
this right as enshrined in Article 12 of the Covenant. The right to health is interpreted therein 
as an inclusive right that extends not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to 
those factors that determine good health including access to safe drinking water and adequate 
sanitation, a sufficient supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and 
environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information. In 2002, 
the Committee further recognised that access to water itself was an independent right. 
Drawing on a range of international treaties and declarations, it stated that “[…] the right to 
water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate 
standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for 
survival.”16 
 
As the overview of the present edicts indicates, the right to water does exist as a right to the 
most essential element of life. But a separate and clearly-stated right to water has not been 
incorporated in international law nor recognised as a fundamental human right so far. Rather, 
a right to water is interpreted as being an implicit component of either existing fundamental 
human rights or is expressly included in non-binding documents that are designed to achieve 
specific ends.17 It has been argued in many documents that recognising a human right to 
water constitutes an important step towards making access to potable water and safe 
sanitation a reality for all. Enforcing that right means that fresh water is a legal entitlement, 
rather than a commodity or service provided on a charitable basis and that the means and 
mechanisms available in the United Nations human rights system will be used to monitor the 
progress of States Parties in realising the right to water and to hold governments 
accountable.18 But this is only the case if the alleged right is normatively backed (meaning 
that it is understood as an inalienable moral right), and if the notoriously unclear normative 
issues are resolved. On the one hand, the bearer of the right’s corresponding obligation has to 
be identified. As said above, governments hold the primary responsibility for ensuring the 
realisation of human rights within their borders. But if governments cannot or do not meet 
their citizens’ rights, the respective obligations seem to pass over to someone else within the 
international community. But who exactly bears, then, the counterpart obligations of the 
alleged right to water? On the other hand, the right’s content has to be clarified: To what 
does a moral right to water entitle one? To drinking water only, or also to productive water? 
                                            
15 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966. 
16 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2002. 
17 See Gleick 1999 and Scanlon et al. 2004. 
18 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2006. 
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I will address these normative questions in the next section. Before that, let us turn to the 
question of the content of the legal right to water (or the suggestion of it). 
 
So far, it has remained ambiguous both in the United Nations’ recommendation of 
November 2002 and in the subsequent international debate whether the content of the right 
to access to water is limited to drinking water and related needs to secure environmental 
sanitation or whether it also includes access to productive water. Article 2 of the General 
Comment 15 interprets the right to water as a right to “sufficient19, safe, acceptable20, 
physically accessible21 and affordable22 water for personal and domestic use. An adequate 
amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of 
water-related disease, to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic 
requirements.”23 Article 2 focuses, thus, on drinking water and secure sanitation alone. But 
Article 7 of the Comment says that “[…] sustainable access to water resources for 
agriculture to realise the right to adequate food […]”24 should be observed, meaning that 
there is also a right to productive water, which significantly contributes to income-generation 
and makes livelihoods sustainable for poor people living in the rural areas of many 
developing countries. 
 
If a human right to water is thought of as a right to drinking water and sanitation only, it 
might be regarded as a fundamental human right guaranteeing basic conditions for mere 
survival and as already included in article 25.1 of the UDHR. But if this right entitles to 
access to productive water, it verges on a much broader concept of social and economic 
rights. There are, however, ongoing controversies about the normative foundation of these 
rights pointing at, for example, the dubious concept of the bearers of responsibility in the 
                                            
19 How much water a person needs for drinking and food preparation varies considerably, according to 
diet, climate and the work they do. Yet those with least access to water supply tend to live in warm 
climates and engage in at least moderately strenuous work. The minimum amount of water needed for 
drinking ranges from about 2 litres in temperate climates to about 4.5 litres per day for people in hot 
climates who have to carry out manual work (see Howard/Bartram 2003). Pregnant women and 
breastfeeding mothers need more water. In addition, most people need at least 2 litres of safe water 
per capita per day for food preparation and some more water for hygiene purposes (personal hygiene, 
laundry, cleaning). 
20 According to the Comment, safe and acceptable mean that drinking water must be free from 
microbes and parasites, and chemical, physical and radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a 
person’s health, and that it must be of tolerable colour and odour. 
21 Everyone must have safe and easy access to adequate facilities and services in order that clean 
drinking water is secured and useable. Accessible drinking water can also help to avoid potentially 
risky methods of water storage and gathering (for example Dengue fever outbreaks in India). 
22 Ensuring the affordability of water requires that services match what people can pay. This 
is not simply a matter of the total cost of water. Many people earn money on an irregular 
basis, which inhibits them from entering into long-term regular financial commitments that 
might be cheaper in the long run. Matching services with people’s ability and willingness to 
pay implies the need for a ‘demand driven’ approach. It may be necessary to offer a range of 
levels of service and technologies, with the potential for progressive upgrading. Cf. also 
WHO 2003, 16. 
23 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2002, Art. 2.  
24 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2002, Art. 7. 
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case of collectives or at the merely progressive realisation of the economic and social rights 
demanded by the ICESCR. I will now turn to these controversies. 
 
2 THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER FROM A MORAL POINT OF VIEW 
 
Deciding which norms should be counted as human rights is a matter of difficulty, and there 
is continuing pressure to expand the list of human rights to include new areas. Many political 
movements would like to see their main concerns categorised as matters of human rights, 
since this would publicise, promote, and legitimate their concerns at the international level. 
An example might be the minorities’ call for cultural rights. 
 
This trend to ‘rights-talk’ currently dominates not only international law and politics, but 
also political ethics and moral philosophy. Of course, there are many benefits to this trend: 
the talk about rights suggests, for example, that something is important, deserving priority in 
reasoning and action. However, the rights’ meaning and value can be undermined when 
almost every personal and political demand is couched as a right. Moreover, the widespread 
rights-talk often obscures the need to specify who bears the counterpart obligations to deliver 
on those rights.25 But unless we can identify the correlative obligations and the responsible 
agents, these rights may amount to little more than useless words – a dramatic result for 
moral theory and practice leading to a ‘human rights inflation’ caused by producing too 
much bad human rights currency.26 Of course, there may be pragmatic or rhetoric reasons for 
expressing some very urgent needs as rights. Whether this ‘rights-talk’ is more conducive to 
poverty alleviation than a more goal- or need-oriented discourse is a matter of political 
affairs and diplomacy and cannot be discussed here.27 The philosophical question merely 
pertains to the normative foundation and justification of the asserted rights: are they 
justifiable as moral human rights, as part of a (yet to be defined) certain minimum standard 
that all human beings – simply because they are human beings – are entitled to? And if so, 
who bears the responsibility of their realisation? If the human right to water should amount 
to more than political rhetoric, we must tackle these questions and investigate whether the 
right to water counts as a moral right or not. 
 
One could argue, however, that this investigation is misleading: Because human rights are 
not (and have never been) rights in a strict (moral) sense, but rather in a fairly loose one, the 
human rights movement and its purposes are not well served by being forced into a narrow 
ethical framework, nor will a normative investigation conduce to strengthening the alleged 
rights. According to some commentators, the most basic idea of the human rights movement 
is not that of a right but the idea of regulating the behaviour of governments through 
                                            
25 See Kuper 2005, ix. 
26 See eg. Orend 2001 and Griffin 2001. 
27 Des Gasper brought to my notice that various authors have argued that human rights discourse is, in 
large part, grounded in basic needs discourse. See for example Johan Galtung’s Human Rights in 
Another Key (Galtung 1994) or Des Gasper’s “Needs and Human Rights” (Gasper 2005). This shows 
that we cannot settle for human rights without thinking of their normative foundation like, for 
example, evaluative concepts of basic needs or capabilities. See also Shue 1996. 
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international norms. When we look at human rights documents we find indeed that they use 
a variety of normative concepts which are not reducible to rights alone. Sometimes these 
documents issue prohibitions, as when the UDHR says that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile […]” (Article 9), at other times they express general 
principles, as illustrated by the UDHR's declaration that “[a]ll are equal before the law […]” 
(Article 7), and at still other times, the documents speak indeed of rights, as for example that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement […]” (Article 13.1). Instead of exploring 
whether a norm that is nominated for the status of human right really deserves the label of a 
moral right, it might be more appropriate to consider whether it is compatible with the 
general idea of human rights that we find in the multiple international human rights 
documents, e.g. whether it ensures that people can have minimally good lives, whether it has 
high priority, and whether it can be supported by strong reasons that make plausible its 
universality and high priority.28 
 
I do not think that the scepticism concerning an ethical investigation into the normative 
concept of a human right to water is justified. On the one hand, the above mentioned 
formulations can be restated in terms of rights (and, in fact, this has been done consistently). 
On the other hand, a moral justification of a certain human right may very well serve the 
purpose of allocating responsibilities and of strengthening and adjusting international law – 
an opportunity which finds more and more interest with international organisations and 
which should not be underestimated.29  
 
So let us turn to the question of whether a human right to water is justifiable as a moral 
human right. The answer depends obviously on the conceptual framework for human rights 
in general and the grounds for their normative justification. Whereas it is broadly accepted 
that human rights should guarantee all human beings’ liberty, for example, by shielding them 
from torture, prosecution or discrimination, it is still controversial how economic and social 
rights or welfare rights are to be defined and justified. The human right to water clearly 
comes, if at all, under the welfare rights – rights that address matters such as education, food, 
and employment. The inclusion of welfare rights in the UDHR has been the source of much 
controversy. Originally, they were, for example, not included in the European Charter of 
Human Rights (ECHR), but put into a separate treaty (the European Social Charter).30 When 
the United Nations began the process of putting the rights of the UDHR into international 
law, it followed the model of the European system: economic and social rights are governed 
in a treaty separate from the one dealing with civil and political rights.31 Thus, the assertion 
of a human right to water needs more explanation tying up with the different approaches to 
the justification of welfare rights.32 It has to be shown, first, that welfare rights – or at least 
                                            
28 See for a helpful discussion of different approaches Orend 2001. 
29 See e.g. Griffin 2000, 29 and Hinsch/Stepanians 2005, 297. 
30 See Beetham 1995. 
31 Des Gasper pointed to me that some authors say that the United Nations began the process 
immediately after 1948 – before the European model existed – but got stuck for 15 years because of 
Cold War disagreements. 
32 Such approaches are discussed, for example, in Gosepath/Lohmann 1998, Orend 2001; the legal and 
historical background is elaborated for example in Tomuschat 2003. 
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some minimal core version of them – can be justified successfully, that the arguments 
against them fail; and second, that the human right to water figures among this core group of 
welfare rights. 
 
There are several objections against welfare rights. For lack of space, I will concentrate only 
on two of the main arguments here:33 1) Welfare rights do not serve truly fundamental 
interests; 2) welfare rights lack the counterpart obligations and are, therefore, no rights in 
sensu stricto. 
 
Ad 1) The assertion that welfare rights do not serve fundamental human interests depends 
obviously on what is included in them. Admittedly, some formulations of welfare rights in 
international human rights documents go beyond what is necessary for a minimally good 
life. The problem is often exemplified by quoting Article 24 of the UDHR stating a right to 
holidays with pay. Such a right pertains indeed more to a good life, not to a minimally 
acceptable standard of life. But it is far from the case that all or most welfare rights regard 
dispensable interests. The importance of food, clothing, housing and other basic material 
conditions of life is, for example, easy to show. On the one hand, these goods are essential to 
people's ability to live or simply to survive. On the other hand, the most vital goods are 
relevant conditions to realise other (and less contentious) human rights. E.g. without basic 
education, people cannot enjoy their political right of democratic participation.34 
 
James Griffin has suggested that we should understand welfare rights exactly in this minimal 
sense, as “[…] protections of one’s human standing – one’s personhood, as one might put 
it.”35 There are, however, two different ways of interpreting a personhood account of human 
rights. As Griffin says, one can see it as “[…] justifying liberty rights, but giving no support 
at all to welfare rights.”36 If this interpretation holds, it seems that little would have been 
won in support of a human right to water. But as Griffin argues, rights are also protections of 
agency, because “I can be stopped from choosing and pursuing my conception of a good life 
                                            
33 A third argument against the interpretation of welfare rights as moral rights is the fact that the 
ICESCR opted for their progressive implementation and thereby treated these rights as being 
somewhat like goals. Goals, however, are not the same as rights. But on the one hand, it is possible to 
think of a minimal right-goal mixture including a duty to try to realise the goal as quickly as possible. 
The countries ratifying the ICESCR agree to make it a matter of government duty to realise the list of 
rights as soon as possible by taking “[…] steps, individually and through international assistance and 
co-operation […] to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognised in the present Covenant […]." (Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 2) The signatories agree, on this interpretation, to make it a 
matter of duty to realise the listed rights as soon and as far as resources permit. On the other hand, a 
major reason for the progressive realisation is that many of the world's countries were poorly placed, 
in terms of economic, institutional, and human resources, to realise these standards fully or even 
largely. For many countries, non-compliance due to inability would have been certain if these 
standards had been treated as immediately binding. The reasons for a progressive implementation 
were, thus, pragmatic not ones of principle. 
34 A similar point is made by Shue 1996. 
35 Griffin 2000, 29. 
36 Griffin 2000, 29. 
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either by other persons’ blocking me or by my suffering such deprivation that I cannot even 
rise to the level of agency. So I am inclined to describe the protection of agency as requiring, 
and human rights therefore as including, not only autonomy and liberty but also minimum 
material provision – that is, some sort of right to welfare.”37 One could argue that this only 
shows that whereas autonomy and liberty are constituents of personhood, material provision 
is a necessary condition of it. But this is the same as saying that being alive is a necessary 
condition of personhood, of being autonomous and free.38 Now, it is certainly true that 
liberty and the conditions to liberty are two separate things.39 But note that liberty rights are 
defended by saying that autonomy should be protected. So if autonomy is not possible 
without these provisions, it is useless to promote those rights. Even those who only defend a 
minimal account of human rights have to vote for at least some provisions, potable water 
being clearly among them.  
 
What about a right to productive water as suggested by the United Nations in the previously 
mentioned Comment 1540? Productive water is essential, for example, for farming and for 
manufacturing services and is, thus, conducive to an increase of families’ incomes by 
boosting crop production and the health of livestock. I doubt that a minimalist account of 
welfare rights as put forward above will allow for a right to productive water as well. Such a 
right pertains to a broader and more contested account of welfare rights making room for a 
right to an adequate standard of living, to work, to self-determination etc. Of course, this 
does not mean that more demanding concepts of welfare rights and a right to productive 
water respectively are not feasible. It means only that a right to access to productive water 
must be justified otherwise than by means of a minimalist account as put forward above. 
 
I see two possibilities here: Either one defends a more substantial and broader account of 
welfare rights allowing for a human right to productive water; or one sees the lack of access 
to productive water as resulting from the violation of other fundamental rights such as either 
property rights or the most fundamental moral right not to be harmed unduly by third parties. 
It has been argued that defending a broader account of welfare rights amounts to the same as 
defending a substantial account of social distributive justice: that each member of a society 
should have access not only to the minimal provision with the necessities of life but also to 
an adequate standard of living, to education, paid work, equality of opportunity and political 
representation.41 Social justice, however, is thought by some to be confined in its original 
meaning to within a certain society. But as said above, human rights persist even if the 
government of a certain society does not fulfil them and the correlative duties fall then onto 
the global community. Claiming that the global community is ultimately responsible for the 
fulfilment of the welfare rights of all human beings, amounts then to the same as arguing for 
                                            
37 Griffin 2000, 29. Sometimes UDHR’s article 3 “Everyone has the right to life […]” is interpreted as 
granting already minimal means of subsistence, because if we accept the right to life, it seems natural, 
to include a right to basic material means (cf. Hinsch/Stepanians 2005, 297 and Rawls 1999, 65). 
However, others have still claimed that this article should merely be interpreted as a liberty right. 
38 See Griffin 2000, 31 and 40. 
39 See Berlin 1969, p. Iiii. 
40 See paragraph I above. 
41 See Gosepath/Lohmann 1998, 15ff. and Shue 1996. 
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global social justice: guaranteeing every human being more than mere survival and some 
minimum decency but social justice in a broader sense. The idea of global social justice is, 
however, much contested. Among other things it is asked whether the domestic principles of 
social justice may be expanded all over the world, or whether we need other principles of 
justice for the global scope, and if so, which ones.42 I will come back to both possibilities in 
my last section.  
 
Ad 2) The second objection to welfare rights says that welfare rights lack counterpart 
obligations and are, thus, under-determined and no moral rights in the proper sense. The 
‘classical’ idea that all rights have to be closely associated with duties whose breach 
constitutes their violation is an attempt to confer a maximum of regulative force upon 
them.43 Or, as said above: unless we can identify the correlative obligations, their content 
and the responsible agents, the alleged rights may amount to little. If we accept this view, we 
are committed to holding that there must be someone with a clear counterpart obligation to 
fulfil the human right to water. This gives rise to the allocation problem: Who has to deliver 
on this right? 
 
Obviously, the allocation problem does not arise with liberty rights: all of us have a right not 
to be barred from pursuing our goals, and the correlative duty falls on every other individual 
or group. We must (prima facie) not harm others, and if we do, we owe these people 
compensation. Welfare rights, instead, involve obligations that are not only negative duties 
of non-interference but will often require positive measures from their addressees, which 
renders them less determinate and leaves open the question about who exactly is responsible 
for their fulfilment. 
 
At least with regard to the legal human rights documents this problem seems, however, less 
intricate. A person's welfare rights impose obligations on the government of the country in 
which the person resides or is located. But this view stands in a certain tension with the 
assertion of human rights as moral rights, for moral rights are conceived as natural rights that 
are grounded in human agency, personhood or vulnerability in contrast to special rights 
grounded in special relationships or transactions and held, for example, only against one’s 
government. The idea of human rights as natural rights does not, however, rule out the idea 
of cost minimisation via division of labour between governments, for example according to a 
global principle of subsidiarity.44 It only excludes the idea that those rights are alienable45 by 
governmental disrespect, meaning that they do not cease to exist if a government does not 
act upon them. But, unfortunately, it is everyday life that some governments don’t have the 
means, the knowledge or the will to realise the rights they should. In many cities, the poorest 
residents live in shanty towns and slums, sometimes on the edge of the city. These 
settlements generally lie outside formal water and sanitation distribution networks. They are 
                                            
42 See, for example, the debates in the volumes by Follesdal/Pogge 2005a, Miller/Hashmi 2001 and 
Pogge 2001 or the essays by Nagel 2005, Beitz 2005 and Miller 1999. 
43 See e.g. Hinsch/Stepanians 2005 or O'Neill 1986. 
44 Stefan Gosepath argues for a global principle of subsidiarity (in Gosepath 2005). 
45 Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other 
considerations.  
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often not recognised by the city authorities, who may not support extension of essential 
services, whether public or private, to these areas. Suppliers of services give a number of 
reasons for not supplying such areas – e.g. that residents cannot pay, that they do not have 
the documentation to prove that they are entitled to services, or that these communities are at 
risk of eviction. Note that this is not only a problem of developing countries; a lot of 
indigenous people in the industrialised world still are without safe water (e.g. some of the 
people living in the ‘First Nation’ reservations of Quebec province in Canada where 76 of 
these reservations are still under advice to boil drinking water and have to rely on bottled 
water for drinking, cooking and brushing their teeth46). If human rights are to be justified as 
moral rights, international agencies and foreign governments have to serve as secondary or 
‘backup’ addressees and have what Henry Shue calls ‘default duties’ of protection and aid if 
the rights to life, security and subsistence are to be sustained.47 How can we make room for a 
fair allocation of the ‘default duties’ between different governments, non-state actors, 
companies and individuals? 
 
Questions about a fair allocation of responsibilities may represent the most pressing and 
perhaps also the most intricate problems in a globalised world. Great efforts have been made 
within the last years towards devising comprehensive institutional frameworks for a fair and 
successful allocation of responsibilities. I will not recapitulate these findings here.48 Rather, I 
would like, in Section 3, to have a look at another lately much discussed argument: As 
mentioned above, it seems to be somewhat a platitude that liberty rights or negative rights 
not to harm others do not face the difficulty of allocating the counterpart obligations. They 
are much less controversial than the positive welfare rights and they hold always for 
everyone. I will therefore examine whether lack of access to water can be deemed a violation 
of other more fundamental moral rights. If so, the argument solves two problems at once: It 
justifies a right not only to potable, but also to productive water, and it meets the allocation 
problem. 
 
3 A RIGHT TO WATER AND THE MORAL RIGHT NOT TO BE UNDULY HARMED 
 
The argument that we should not exclusively think of our obligations towards the poor in 
terms of fulfilling their positive rights but rather in terms of our not violating their negative 
right not to be unduly harmed has been defended most prominently by Thomas Pogge. 
According to him, the protection of human rights should rely on Article 28 of the UDHR, 
which states: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.”49 The realisation of human 
rights must, then, be understood as part of a just global order prohibiting exploitive contracts 
and unfair market mechanisms hindering the governments of developing countries from the 
                                            
46 See the article “Water still a problem on 76 reserves”, CBC News, last updated on 20 Feb 2006, 
http://www.safewater.org/. 
47 See Henry Shue 1996, 170ff. 
48 See e.g. the lately issued volumes by Chatterjee 2004, Kuper 2005, Barry/Pogge 2005 and 
Follesdal/Pogge 2005b. 
49 See Pogge 2002 and Pogge 2004. 
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realisation of the welfare rights. The current global order allows developed countries, for 
example, to confer upon corrupt elites and undemocratic rulers the privileges freely to 
dispose of the country’s natural resources (in Pogge’s terminology the ‘international resource 
privilege’) and, secondly, freely to borrow in the country’s name and therefore commit the 
country to repay, regardless of who has received the funds and how they have been use 
(‘international borrowing privilege’).50 According to Pogge, the global order impoverishes 
the already poor even more by preventing the governments of developing countries from 
rehabilitating the finances and fulfilling the welfare rights of their citizens. 
 
Much ink has been spilled discussing this argument, and I will focus instead on its relevance 
for access to safe water. Could lack of access to water be interpreted as resulting from an 
unjust global order making it impossible for developing countries to realise the rights of their 
citizens? Even if Pogge is right in saying that international law allows the rich countries to 
profit from the impoverishment of the weakest, governments in developing countries often 
do not pay enough attention to ensure access to safe water and sanitation for the whole 
population and set other priorities. The Human Development Report 2006 states: “[F]ew 
countries treat water and sanitation as a political priority, as witnessed by limited budget 
allocations.”51 In Ethiopia the military budget is 10 times the water and sanitation budget, in 
Pakistan 47 times.52 However, this does not mean that the industrialized world does not play 
a role in the water crises we face today. As I will show in the following, lack of access to 
safe water (potable water as well as productive water) must be interpreted, at least in some 
cases, as a direct or indirect violation of those people’s liberty rights and property rights. The 
global order – and the rich and powerful countries sustaining it and profiting from it53 – 
might be responsible for this deprivation insofar as the order does not call to account those 
who violate the poor people’s rights. 
 
Reality proves always to be much more complex when dealing with concrete examples. 
Issues within the realm of ‘real world justice’ should therefore be addressed in an 
interdisciplinary and intercultural manner. In this theoretical paper, my task can only be to 
address some critical questions from an ethical perspective, and I will content myself with 
giving some examples from two vital issues, namely water privatisation and environmental 
issues. 
 
                                            
50 See Pogge 2002 and Pogge 2004. 
51 See UNDP 2000, V. 
52 See UNDP 2000, 8f. 
53 It is to my view an open question in what respect profiting from harm is morally wrong and 
to what extent it calls for compensation. Thomas Pogge has argued that the rich people in 
the western world have “a negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit 
from the unjust impoverishment of others.” (Pogge 2002, 197; see also p. 21, 66f, 172 and 
Pogge 2004, 273) How do these forms of causal involvements hang together and how 
should we evaluate them? I have said more about that in a forthcoming article (“Beitragen 
und Profitieren. Ungerechte Weltordnung und kausale Verstrickung”, together with Norbert 
Anwander in Weltarmut und Ethik, Paderborn, Mentis, 2007). 
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a) Water privatisation and the involvement of foreign water companies 
 
The involvement of the private sector in water delivery has accelerated over the past decade. 
Private sector involvement has extended beyond selling water from trucks and supply of 
infrastructure to the full operation and management of water delivery systems.54 The roles of 
public and private providers have been a source of much heat in public debate. According to 
the Human Development Report 2006, this debate “has been curiously out of step with 
reality. While the number of people served by private water companies has grown – from 
about 51 million in 1990 to nearly 300 million in 2002 – public water companies account for 
more than 70% of total investment globally, and fewer than 3% of people in developing 
countries receive water or sanitation services that are fully or partially private.”55 Although 
private provision did not turn out to be the “magic bullet solution”56, privatisation of water 
services is still promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
 
I cannot discuss here the pros and cons of privatisation in the water sector in general. Rather, 
I am interested in the possible involvement of foreign water companies and in the claim that 
the global order harms the poor. Under GATS rules (GATS stands for ‘General Agreement 
on Trade in Services’, is part of the WTO treaties, and aims to promote international trade in 
services and to remove barriers to such trade), a government cannot give better treatment to 
local service companies than to foreign service companies (e.g. Suez and Vivendi) in the 
area it has listed in the agreement.57 As a result, water privatisation in developing countries 
generally has been led by foreign multinational companies who are believed to provide 
services more efficaciously, cheaper and technically more reliably.58 But just as vulnerable 
to corruption as state companies and operating according to a profit-driven corporate agenda 
potentially incompatible with delivering an essential service, private water companies have 
in practice often failed in providing citizens with safe, affordable water. Although a 
privatised water industry could lead to increased technical efficiency, it needs effective 
regulation. While governments under international human rights law may permit private 
sector involvement, their own responsibilities remain the same. Steps must be taken to 
ensure that the sufficiency, safety, affordability and accessibility of water are protected as 
well as ensuring that everyone will enjoy the right in the shortest possible time. To act upon 
these responsibilities, one option might be so called public-private partnerships in which 
priority is given to the poor, through stable and transparent national regulatory frameworks 
respecting local conditions and involving all concerned stakeholders.59 However, 
                                            
54 England and Wales have entirely privatised their water supply and sewerage systems. Bakker 2004 
gives a review of the so-called ‚British Model’. For an examination of the interrelationship between 
urbanization and water supply privatization in cities in the global South, see also Bakker 2003. 
55 UNDP 2000, 89. See also the study by Gary Wolff and Eric Hallstein (Wolff 2001). The full report 
is available on http://www.pacinst.org/reports/beyond_privatization/Beyond_Privatization.pdf. 
56 UNDP 2000, 77. 
57 For an overview of the impact of the GATS rules on poor people's right to water and national 
governments' ability to safeguard the interests of poor people through regulations, see e.g. Mehta/la 
Cour Madsen 2005. 
58 See Razzaque 2004. 
59 See Balanyá et al. 2005. 
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municipalities in developing countries often do not dispose of either the know-how or the 
will to supervise the foreign companies. And the companies, in turn, profit from weak laws 
and the powerlessness of the poor countries that depend heavily on the investment of the 
private sector. Water prices rise without consultation with the public, there is no monitoring 
whether the service provided was satisfactory and the poorest citizens living in the 
countryside are often not served at all. The opponents of water privatisation therefore point 
to recent empirical evidence which show how foreign water privatisation in developing 
countries has frequently had severely deleterious consequences in terms of water distribution 
for the poor who are unable to pay for the amount of water needed.60 
 
While in most countries of the world no foreign companies are currently involved in public-
private partnerships in the water sector, there is continuing pressure from the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank to open the water markets to foreign companies and problems could 
increase. From a moral point of view, the global community has to work for better 
international regulations preventing foreign companies from exploitative business strategies 
and for an alignment of the GATS regime allowing for a fair competition and the 
participation of local companies.  
 
b) Environmental issues 
 
A lot of water problems are related to its accessibility and quality and not to its relative 
abundance.61 Serious problems might arise for example because of the construction of dams 
(e.g. Narmada Valley in India), soil waterlogging and salinisation caused by excessive 
surface water irrigation or surface water diversions (e.g. Aral Sea).62 Unsafe water may 
contain toxic chemicals from natural sources as well as from pollution. Some naturally 
occurring toxic chemicals such as arsenic and fluoride affect many people (e.g., in much of 
Bangladesh people are exposed to arsenic through their drinking water). This calls for 
positive action fulfilling at least their welfare right to safe potable water. But there are many 
more man-made disasters than natural disasters. Pollution from factories, farming or sewage 
can for example greatly damage the quality of water used for drinking. Access to safe water 
is threatened by deforestation and by exposures to toxic chemicals, hazardous wastes and 
contamination destroying also fishing resources and poisoning irrigation water. One of the 
most damaging sectors is the garment industry. Dyestuff and bleaching agents flow 
unfiltered in the local rivers polluting the most precious resources of the population.63 
Whereas the wealthier can afford purchasable purified water, the peasants and slum dwellers 
are left with unsafe water and may become even more impoverished. Those who pollute the 
                                            
60 See Hall 2002. One of the most famous cases is the water war in Cochabamba, Bolivia. See e.g. the 
report on the International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC), http://www.irc.nl/page/2082. For 
further examples see UNDP 2000 and the article by UNDP “Cruel irony: water costs the most for 
those who can least afford it” on http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/press_kit.cfm. 
61 See Llamas 2004, 6. 
62 See Llamas 2004, 18.  
63 In Tiruppur, India, dyestuff and bleaching agents nearly destroyed the local river Noyyal. See e.g. 
Bühler/Fuchs 2002, 105ff. and Jacob/Azariah 1998. 
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natural environment are not just destroying nature, but clearly violating the most 
fundamental right not to be unduly harmed. 
 
Such environmentally abusive practices of national and transnational corporations (TNCs) 
have caused devastation of the natural resources of people around the world in the last 
decades. So far, the attempts to regulate TNC behaviour have failed. In 1993, the United 
Nations gave up the effort to establish a code for TNCs when it became obvious that 
compromise was nearly impossible.64 The international initiative Agenda 21 attempted to 
encourage TNCs “[…] to introduce policies demonstrating the commitment […] to adopt 
standards of operation equivalent to or not less stringent than those existing in the country of 
origin.”65 This represents progress since ninety percent of the world's TNCs originate from 
developed countries with more stringent environmental regulation. However, it is a non-
binding instrument. The lately issued United Nations “Draft Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights”,66 raise hope that a binding instrument allowing for taking legal actions against 
corporations who destroy natural resources will be found one day. Despite the unlikelihood 
that a legal instrument to award damages against TNCs will soon be established, the 
international community – when formulating a human right to water – must above all 
consider the creation of duties with regards to the private sector not to destroy the natural 
resources of less powerful people.67  
 
To sum up, transnational corporations play sometimes indeed a harmful role with regard to 
safeguarding access to safe water for the global poor. We – the citizens of the industrialised 
world – have to work for global rules prohibiting the exploitation and pollution of natural 
resources in foreign countries and impeding harmful forms of water privatisation.68 Fulfilling 
the human right to water is not only about ‘helping’ the poor, but also about not hindering 
them from freely enjoying their right to dispose of their natural resources. However, the 
global water crisis cannot be reduced to harmful forms of globalisation. There is, thus, need 
for positive efforts to be made by the wealthy countries and citizens to invest know-how and 
financial means to overcome the crisis. 
 
NGOs, governmental development agencies and the United Nations have persistently 
pointed to water as a ‘common good’, a ‘common property’ or a ‘common heritage of 
mankind’, alluding to the idea, that the water resources belong to all. Sometimes it is argued 
that water as a common good cannot be reduced to a commodity nor become a property of 
private, commercially-oriented interests. Water is indeed different from other tradable goods 
in so far as its resources are finite. This, however, does not stand against the general idea of 
                                            
64 See Scanlon et al. 2004, 31. 
65 Agenda 21 1992. 
66 The draft norms can be found e.g. at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/NormsApril2003.html. 
They are not legally binding yet, and there are strong resistances on the side of the corporations 
against their enforcement. 
67 Scanlon et al. 2004, 30f. 
68 This is not to say that there are no positive examples of transnational corporations involved in water 
privatisation or industries. 
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trading purified potable water. Oil is a finite resource as well, and nothing stands against the 
idea that the consumer should pay for the processed resource. Nor does the idea that we 
vitally need water exclude its commodification: we also need food, and it has become quite 
natural for us to pay for it. One may argue, that most food has to be prepared, but the same 
holds true with drinking water which has to be purified before consumption.69 From an 
ethical point of view it is, thus, unclear who owns the water resources and thus, has the right 
to use them, to sell them to companies or also to pollute them. But instead of dealing with 
the notoriously unclear concepts of ‘common goods’ or ‘heritage of mankind’, I deem it 
more promising to elaborate on the concept of property rights and ownership.70 Admittedly, 
in ethical theory questions about the system of ownership are said to be only secondary or 
derivative questions following from theories of justice. Property is, thus, understood as the 
product of social rules, and normative thinking about the former must be preceded by 
normative thinking about the latter.71 I said in section 2 that there are ongoing debates 
concerning the justification and the principles of global justice. The discourse about water 
rights shows that theories of global justice need above all to incorporate approaches of a fair 
distribution of access to scarce natural resources which are indispensable to life and to 
poverty reduction.72 There is, thus, need to elaborate on the concept of justified ownership 
(linked with legitimate rights to trade and sale). Such a concept could for example call for 
democratic management of the resources at stake involving all relevant stakeholders of a 
society. Special attention has to be paid also to rights of vulnerable groups such as women, 
elderly persons, children and indigenous people.73 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
“Make water a human right – and mean it!” is one of the slogans of the 2006 Human 
Development Report dedicated to the global water crisis. I have tried to give some answers 
to what it probably could and should mean to understand a right to water as a human right 
from an ethical perspective and what the implications of such an understanding are. The aim 
was to analyse the normative foundations of a human right to water and try to give an 
overview of some of the most pressing and intricate ethical questions regarding a rights-
based approach to access to water. 
 
I have argued that a human right to drinking water is justifiable as a moral right. Even the 
most minimalist accounts of human rights include some (even if only a few) positive welfare 
rights, water being clearly among them. No coherent (let alone acceptable) moral theory may 
                                            
69 In many cases this is even true for irrigation water: Polluted irrigation water may poison the plants 
which in turn may poison the cattle eating these plants. 
70 The legal human right to property is stated, for example, in Article 17 of the UDHR: “1. Everyone 
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property.” 
71 See De Soto/Cheneval 2006.  
72 See Boudreaux 2006. 
73 UNDP persistently points to the fact that indigenous people are amongst the most vulnerable groups 
within the global water crisis. See UNDP 2000 and also UNESCO 2006. 
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do without positive rights (e.g. the costs of liberty include also the costs of law and criminal 
justice; political participation presupposes some basic education; the freedom to live one’s 
life autonomously requires basic health care, etc.). A minimalist account, however, faces two 
problems with regard to water rights: on the one hand it only allows for a provision with 
potable water (on not for irrigation water), on the other hand it is unclear who is responsible 
for fulfilling the right to water of those living in countries where the governments cannot or 
do not act upon their citizens’ rights. A negative duties-account arguing that the developed 
world does not (only) fail to help the poor, but above all hinders them from enjoying their 
welfare rights because we contribute to and profit from an unjust world order, could solve 
the latter and maybe even the former problem. I have claimed that there are indeed cases 
where transnational corporations harm the poor by polluting their water resources or by 
sustaining or initiating harmful forms of privatisation. However, the water crisis cannot be 
solely traced back to a problem of harmful forms of globalisation alone – and yet the crisis 
will not be overcome without positive efforts from the developed countries to make safe 
water for all a reality. 
 
The debate on water scarcity shows that access to water pervades all aspects of human 
development and poverty alleviation. The costs of deprivation in water and sanitation include 
4’900 child deaths each day and lifecycles of disadvantage affecting millions of people, with 
illness and lost educational opportunities in childhood leading to poverty in adulthood.74 
Accounts of global justice therefore have (among other things) to incorporate theories of fair 
distribution of natural resources and special attention has to be paid to water. I have 
suggested that theories of justified ownership and property rights require further attention 
here. There is also need to further elaborate on the question of a fair allocation of 
responsibilities to act upon the demand of global justice. In light of the fact that the global 
water crisis is not about absolute shortages of physical supply, but that the roots of the crises 
can be traced back to poverty, flawed water management and unequal power relationships, 
the good news is that the crises can be overcome. Hopefully we will not content ourselves 
with the bad news that we have not yet agreed upon what it means to share the 
responsibilities in a fair manner to tackle the problem successfully. 
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